Peace in Ukraine Depends on Beijing

Why China Holds the Keys to Ukraine's Future

I’ve been saying since 2022 that the key to ending the war in Ukraine isn’t in Moscow. It’s in Beijing. That may sound counterintuitive at first, but the logic behind it is relatively simple: China gains more from this war than Russia does.

For starters, the war has served as a real-time test of the West’s willingness to stand by a non-NATO country under direct military attack. That’s not just important for Ukraine; it has clear implications for Taiwan. Second, Russia’s growing dependence on China has shifted the dynamic between the two. Beijing has been able to secure many deals at Russia’s expense, especially when in the energy sector. Third, and maybe most importantly, the war helps take pressure off China. With the U.S. and Europe focused on Ukraine, Beijing has more breathing room. The talk of “containing China” may already be outdated - it’s been not possible to contain her since the 2000s, but it still makes Chinese leadership nervous. It, by the way, resulted in a tightening of political control under Xi, particularly in places like Hong Kong.

That’s why one particular moment stood out. On July 2, 2025, during a long four-hour meeting in Brussels, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas that China “can’t accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine” because it would let the U.S. “turn its full attention to China.” Whether he meant to or not, he inadvertently revealed the underlying structure of China’s strategic calculus.

His comment strips away any illusion of neutrality. Officially, China keeps saying it’s “not a party to the Ukraine issue.” But that claim doesn’t hold up when its top diplomat privately admits that China has a strategic interest in keeping Russia from losing. It’s not about solidarity with Moscow but rather about China’s own strategic interests. Thus, although China may not be on the battlefield, it’s deeply involved in the outcome. And that involvement isn’t just regional. It’s global.

The Geopolitical Chess Game

China’s position on Ukraine has never really been about moral neutrality or some principled stance on non-interference. And it’s not about backing Russia either. What’s really at play is strategic patience. Waiting, watching, and quietly recalculating the balance in a global competition where every crisis offers a possibility to be used in China’s advantage. Thus, for Beijing, Ukraine isn’t a battlefield. It’s an opportunity.

The thinking in Beijing is fairly straightforward. Every dollar the U.S. pours into defending Ukraine is a dollar that won’t be spent bolstering Pacific deterrence. Every NATO summit focused on Russia is a meeting not focused on how to contain China. And every American troop or missile system deployed to Eastern Europe is one fewer available in the event of a crisis over Taiwan.

From Beijing’s point of view, the war in Ukraine functions like a slow, grinding tax on American global power. The longer it drags on, the more it chips away at U.S. bandwidth - military, diplomatic, and strategic. And that suits China just fine.

The Limits of Russian Agency

This view pushes back against the common assumption that Russia alone determines how this war unfolds. Yes, Putin launched the invasion, but at this point, China has become the most consequential external player. Through its economic support, supply of dual-use technologies, and diplomatic shielding in global forums, Beijing has positioned itself as more than just a bystander. It now holds real leverage over Moscow’s decisions.

That leverage is becoming harder to ignore. After the record drone attack on Kyiv in June 2025, Ukrainian officials displayed debris from a Russian Geran-2 combat drone. The markings were clear: manufactured in China. This isn’t just about trade. It’s part of a broader effort to keep Russia’s war machine running while preserving just enough distance to deny direct involvement.

But China’s role goes well beyond arms components. Since the war began, the economic ties between Beijing and Moscow have tightened significantly. Trade is booming. Energy deals are expanding. New financial workarounds have been set up to sidestep Western sanctions. The result is a dependency that runs in one direction: Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia. And increasingly, that means the Kremlin can’t make major strategic moves without checking the temperature in Beijing first.

The Beijing Doctrine

Wang Yi’s remarks in Brussels laid bare what might be called the emerging “Beijing Doctrine” on Ukraine: a strategy of controlled prolongation keeping the war going just long enough to serve China’s interests, while keeping its own exposure low. This approach plays out across several dimensions.

Strategic Distraction. The goal is to keep the United States preoccupied with Europe rather than fully pivoting to the Indo-Pacific. Wang’s admission that China “can’t accept Russia losing” because it would let the U.S. “turn its full attention to China” makes this priority explicit.

Managed Support. Beijing is walking a careful line, doing just enough to keep Russia from collapsing, but not enough to cross the threshold into direct military involvement. This explains the steady flow of dual-use technologies and the deepening economic ties, all calibrated to avoid triggering a sharper Western response.

Diplomatic Flexibility. Officially, China maintains the posture of neutrality. But in practice, it resists any peace initiative that might leave Russia weakened or without gains. The pattern suggests a preference not for peace, but for a kind of frozen conflict that preserves Chinese leverage.

Long-Term Positioning. Every month the war drags on serves China’s broader strategic aims. It erodes Western unity, drains resources, and chips away at the credibility of the existing international order. For Beijing, time itself is a tool and this war buys it.

The Leverage Point

This is why focusing only on Moscow hasn’t worked. If China has a stake in keeping the war going, then peace can’t just be negotiated through the Kremlin. It has to take Beijing’s position into account, especially its concern that, if Russia loses, the U.S. will shift full strategic attention to China. That doesn’t mean giving in to Chinese pressure. But it does mean recognizing that peace in Ukraine depends on something larger than Ukraine itself. It depends on the shape of global competition.

And here’s the main point: China isn’t invulnerable. Its economy still leans heavily on Western consumers and advanced foreign tech. It needs access to global finance. It relies on shipping routes controlled by American allies. More than anything, Beijing wants to avoid being cut off or isolated because that would undercut everything it’s trying to build.

That’s the paradox. In the short term, the war serves China. It ties down the West and pushes Russia further into dependence. But over time, the risks grow. The longer this drags on, the more likely we are to see NATO expand again, European rearmament pick up speed, and Washington and Brussels grow closer. Western responses to aggression today could easily become templates for how they respond to a Taiwan scenario tomorrow.

The war is also starting to reshape the global economy. Countries are building supply chains around trusted partners. Critical tech is being brought back home. This trend cuts against China’s model. The longer the war lasts, the deeper those changes set in. And eventually, the strategic costs for Beijing could outweigh the short-term gains.

The Path Forward

Recognizing China's pivotal role suggests a different diplomatic approach. Rather than treating Beijing as a potential mediator, the West should engage China as a principal stakeholder whose interests must be addressed for any sustainable solution. This means:

Direct Engagement: Acknowledge China's strategic concerns while making clear that continued conflict escalation will ultimately harm Chinese interests more than accommodation would.

Economic Pressure: Use China's economic vulnerabilities to increase the costs of sustaining Russia's war effort. This includes more aggressive sanctions on dual-use technology transfers and Chinese financial institutions that facilitate Russian operations.

Strategic Clarity: Demonstrate that the West's commitment to Ukraine is sustainable and that conflict prolongation will not achieve China's goal of strategic distraction.

Offer Alternatives: Provide China with face-saving ways to shift from conflict prolongation to conflict resolution, potentially through broader strategic dialogues that address Chinese concerns.

The Moment of Truth

Wang Yi’s remarks in Brussels were not just a diplomatic misstep. They were a window into how China sees this war, and that changes how we need to think about it. Ukraine’s fight is, of course, about resisting Russian imperialism and defending national sovereignty. But it’s also part of something larger: the struggle over the shape of the global order, between established powers and those trying to rewrite the rules.

That perspective doesn’t take away from the moral case for supporting Ukraine. If anything, it sharpens the stakes. It shows why peace remains out of reach. As long as China sees the war as serving its interests, no amount of pressure on Moscow alone will be enough to end it.

Therefore, it is necessary to make Ukraine to be able to win this war at the tactical level. This means supplying enough hardware to beat Russia. It is simple as that.

Nevertheless, the solution at the strategic level lies in Beijing, but not in the way China’s leaders currently imagine. If their goal is to use the conflict to keep American attention divided, they may soon find the costs outweighing the benefits. Economic strain, diplomatic backlash, and deepening structural shifts in the global economy all point to long-term damage.

The real question is whether Beijing sees that in time. As the bridge between war and peace runs through Beijing, it’s in China’s hands to stop damage before it becomes irreversible.